enemy dominated the Far East . In September 1940, Japan became the third member, with Germany and Italy, of the Axis powers . Japan had pursued its own program of expansion in China and elsewhere in th e 1930s which directly challenge d America's interests . Here too, in the Pacific arena, the neutral Unite d States was moving toward actions, political and economic, that coul d lead to a clash with Japan .
In this hectic world atmosphere, America began to build its military strength . Shortly before Germany attacked Poland, at mid-year 1939, th e number of active duty servicemen stood at 333,473 : 188,839 in th e Army, 125,202 in the Navy, an d 19,432 in the Marine Corps . A yea r later, the overall strength was 458,365 and the number of Marines wa s 28,345 . By early summer of 1941, the Army had 1,801,101 soldiers on active duty, many of them National Guardsmen and Reservists, but mos t of them men enlisted after Congress authorized a peacetime draft . The Navy, also augmented'by the recall of Reservists, had 269,023 men on it s active rolls . There were 54,359 Marines serving on 1 July 1941, all the Reservists available and a steadily increasing number of volunteers . Neither the Navy nor the Marin e Corps had need for the draft to fil l their ranks.
The Marine Corps that grew in strength during 1939-41 was a Service oriented toward amphibious operations and expeditionary duty. It also had a strong commitment to th e Navy beyond its amphibious/expeditionary role as it provided Marine detachments to guar d naval bases and on board capital ships throughout the world . Marine aviation squadrons -all Marine pilots were naval aviators and many were carrier qualified -reinforced the, Navy's air arm .
Two decades of air and groun d campaigns in the Caribbean and Central America, the era of th e "banana wars;' had ended in 1934 when the last Marines withdrew from Nicaragua, having policed th e election of a new government . With their departure, enough men becam e available to have meaningful fleet landing exercises (FLEXs) which tested doctrine, troops, and equipment in partnership with the Navy. And the doctrine tested was both new and important.
Throughout the 1920s, when Major General Commandant Joh n A. Lejeune led the Corps, the doughty World War I commander of, briefly, the renowned 4th Marine Brigade, and then its parent 2d Infantry Division, had steadfastly emphasized the expeditionary role of Marines . Speaking to the student s and faculty of the Naval War Colleg e in 1923, Lejeune said: "The maintenance, equipping, and training of its expeditionary force so it will b e in instant readiness to support th e Fleet in the event of War, I deem to be the most important Marine Corps duty in time of peace' But the demands of that same expeditionary duty, with Marines deployed in th e Caribbean, in Central America, in the Philippines, and in China stretched the Corps thin .
Existing doctrine for amphibious operations, both in assault an d defense, the focal point of wartime service by Marines, was recognized MajGen Wendell C. Neville, 14th Commandant of the Marine Corps, died after serving little more than a year in office . Neville shared Weune 's determinatio n that the Marine Corps have a meaningful role as an amphibious force trained for expeditionary use by the Navy.
Department of Defense Photo (USMO 303062 as inadequate . All sorts of deficiencies existed, in amphibious purpose, in shipping, in landing craft, in th e areas of air and naval gunfire support, and particularly in the methodology and logistics of the highl y complicated ship-to-shore movement of troops and their supplies once ashore. The men who succeede d Lejeune as Major General Commandant upon his retirement after two terms in office (eight years) at th e Corps' helm, Wendell C . "Buck" Neville, also a wartime commander of the 4th Marine Brigade, Ben M . Fuller, who commanded a brigade in Santo Domingo during the war, and John H. Russell, Jr., a brigade commander in Haiti who then became Americas High Commissioner in tha t country for eight years, all shared Lejeunes determination that the Marine Corps would have a meaningful role as an amphibious force trained for expeditionary use by th e Navy. Each man left his own mark upon the Corps in an era of reduce d appropriations and manpower as a result of the Depression that plague d the United States during their tenure .
Neville, who had been awarded the Medal of Honor for his part in the fighting at Vera Cruz in 1914, un--fortunately died after serving little more than a year (19291930) as Commandant, but his successors , Fuller (1930 Fuller ( -1934 and Russel l (1934 Russel l ( -1936 , both served to age 64 , then the mandatory retirement age for senior officers . All of these Commandants, as Lejeune, were graduates of the U .S. Naval Academy a t Annapolis and had served two year s as naval cadets on board warships after graduation and before accepting commissions as Marine second lieutenants. As a consequence, their understanding of the Navy wa s pervasive as was their conviction tha t the Marine Corps and the Navy were inseparable partners in amphibious operations . In this instance, the Annapolis tie of the Navy and Marin e Corps senior leaders, for virtually al l admirals of the time were Nava l Academy classmates, was beneficia l to the Corps.
As his term as Commandant cam e to a close Ben Fuller was able to effect a far-reaching change that Joh n Russell was to carry further into execution . In December 1933, with th e approval of the Secretary of th e Navy, Fuller redesignated the existing Marine expeditionary forces o n both coasts as the Fleet Marine Force (FMF) to be a type command of th e U.S. Fleet. Building on the infantry- men of the 5th Marines at Quantic o and those of the 6th Marines at San Diego, two brigades came into being which were the precursors of the 1s t and 2d Marine Divisions of World War II. In keeping with the times, Commandant Russell could point ou t the next year that he had only 3,000 Marines available to man the FMF, but the situation would improve as Marines returned from overseas stations .
The slowly building brigades an d their attendant squadrons of Marine aircraft, the only American troop s with combat and expeditionary experience beyond the trenches and battlefields of France, came into being in a climate of change from the "old ways" of performing their mission. At the Marine base at Quantico, Virginia, also the home o f advanced officer training for th e Corps, a profound event had taken place in November 1933 that would alter the course of the war to come .
That month, all classes of the Marine Corps Schools were suspended and the students and faculty, including a sprinkling of Navy officers, were directed to concentrate their efforts on developing a detailed manual which would provide the guidance for the conduct of amphibious operations. The decision was not purely a Marine Corps one, since Quantic o and the staff of the Naval War College at Newport, Rhode Island, had been exchanging ideas on the subjec t for more than a decade . All naval planners knew that the execution o f the contingency operations they envisioned worldwide would be flawed if the United States did not have adequate transport and cargo shipping , appropriate and sufficient landing craft, or trained amphibious assaul t troops. But the Quantico workin g group, headed by Colonel Ellis B . Miller, proceeded on the assumption that all these would be forthcoming . They developed operating theories based on their experience and their hopes which could be refined by practice. They formulated answers to thorny questions of command relationships, they looked at naval gunfire and air support problems an d provided solutions, they addresse d the ship-to-shore movement o f troops and developed unloading , boat control, and landing procedures, and they decided on beach party and shore party methods to control the unloading of supplies o n the beaches . In January 1934, a truly seminal document in the history o f amphibious warfare was completed and the "Tentative Manual for Landing Operations" was published by the Marine Corps. In the years that followed, as fleet landing exercises refined procedures, as the hoped-for improved shipping and landing craft gradually appeared, and as increasing numbers of seamen and assaul t troops were trained in amphibious landing techniques, the Quantico manual was reworked and expanded, but its core of innovative thinking remained . In 1938 the Navy promulgated the evolved manual as Despite the fiscal constraints of the Depression, the number and variety of naval ships devoted to amphibious purposes gradually increased in the 1930s. As the threat of American involvement in the war also grew stronger, vastly increased funds were made available for the Navy, the country's "first line of defense," and specialized transport and cargo ship s appeared. These were tested and modified and became an increasin g factor in the FLEXs which took place every year from 1935 on, usually with practice landings at Culebra and Vieques Islands off Puerto Rico in th e Atlantic Ocean, at San Clemente Is-
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The design of this Higgins landing craft, loaded with a military truck, shown her e in May 1941, served as the basis for the landing craft, vehicle and personnel (LCVP) .
land off the southern Californi a coast, and in the Hawaiian Islands .
While the number of "big" amphibious ships, transports and carg o vessels, slowly grew in number, th e small boat Navy of amphibious landing craft similarly evolved and increased. They were vital to th e success of landing operations, a means to get assault troops ashore swiftly and surely. For most Marines of the era, there are memories o f ships' launches, lighters, and experimental boats of all sorts tha t brought them to the beach, or at leas t to the first sandbar or reef offshore . Rolling over the side of a boat and wading through the surf was a common experience . One future Commandant, then a lieutenant, recalled making a practice landing on Maui in the Hawaiian Islands as his uni t returned from expeditionary duty i n China in 1938 . He described the landing as "one of those old timers " made in "these damned moto r launches, you know, with a "ro w and everything-never made for a landing." The result, he said in colorful memory, was "you grounded ou t somewhere 50 yards from the beac h and jumped in . Sometimes your hat floated and sometimes you made it . "
The landing craft that changed this picture was the Higgins boat, named after its inventor, Andrew Higgins , who developed a boat of shallo w draft that could reach the beach i n three to four feet of water, land a n infantry platoon, and then retract to return for another load . First used o n an experimental basis in FLEX 5 (1938) at Culebra, it won its way over rivals and was adopted as the standard personnel landing craft by 1940 . In its initial hundreds the Higgin s boat had a sloping bow that require d of its passengers an over-the-side agility after it grounded . In 1941, a version, most familiar to World War I I veterans, was introduced which had a bow ramp which allowed men and vehicles to exit onto a beach or a t least into knee-high, not neck-high water. This was the 36-foot Landin g Craft, Vehicle and Personnel (LCVP ) which was fitted to the boat davit s on every amphibious transport an d cargo vessel . Its companion boat, the 50-foot, ramped Landing Craft , Mechanized (LCM), also a development of Andrew Higgins, provide d the means for landing tanks, artillery, and heavy vehicles.
The variety of landing craft tha t eventually evolved, and the tasks to which they were put, was limite d Florida in 1926 Florida in , 1928 Florida in , and 1932 . Donal d Roebling's father, financier John A . Roebling, had witnessed the loss of life brought about by these storms in the swampy areas of the Okeechobee region . Spurred by a challeng e from his father to use his engineering talents to design and develop a vehicle "that would bridge the gap between wher e a boat is grounded and a car is flooded out," Donald Roebling, the grandson of the designer and builder of th e Brooklyn Bridge, started work on his Alligator amphibian tractor in early 1933 .
Roebling and his staff completed their first model Alligator in early 1935 . It used aluminum, a comparatively new and unproven material, in the construction of the hull t o reduce weight and increase buoyancy. It was propelled o n land and water by paddle-tread tracks and was then powered by a Chrysler 92-horsepower industrial engine . This first model was then modified and upgraded so extensively that it is generally referred to as the second model Alligator . This second Alligator had improved tracks wit h built-in roller bearings which rode in specially designed stee l channels which eliminated the need for idler and bogi e wheels to support the tracks, as were used on most tracto r and tank designs .
In Roebling for use as a rescue vehicle in the Florida everglades, the LVT, o r the Alligator as it was soon popularl y named, could travel over land or water using its cupped treads fo r propulsion . The stories of the "discovery" of Roebling's invention and of its subsequent testing and development are legion . It proved to have an invaluable capability, not considered in its initial concept; it could cros s coral reefs, and coral reefs fringed the beaches of most Pacific islands . Th e amphibian tractor, or amtrac to its users, was a natural weapon for Marines and there was hardly a whispe r of opposition to its adoption . When the first production LVTs rolled of f Roebling's assembly line at his plan t at Clearwater, Florida, in July 1941 , there was already a detachment o f Marines at nearby Dunedin learnin g to drive and maintain the new tractors and to develop tactics for thei r effective use .
In the new Marine divisions the n forming on each coast there woul d be a place for an amtrac battalion . The LVTs were conceived at first a s a logistics vehicle, a means to carry troops and supplies onto and inshor e of difficult beaches . But no sooner did the LVTs make their appearance in significant numbers than the thought occurred that the tractors could be armed and that they coul d have a role as an assault vehicle , leading assault waves . ashore in Europe, the United States was in fact deeply involved in supporting the embattled British . For a long period in 1940-41, the Marine Corps was concerned in this effort , and to the troops in training, particularly those on the east coast, there was a real question whether they might leave their bases for Europe o r the Pacific . Marine pilots had a definite fascination with the exploits of the Royal Air Force in its battle s with the German Luftwaffe .
Atlantic Theate r
Because the British had fought th e Germans since 1939, their combat know-how and experience in air, land, and sea battles were invaluable to the American military. A steady stream of American observers, largely unheralded to the public, visited Britain and British and Allied forces in the field during 1940-41 t o learn what they could of such new warfare innovations as radar, pioneered by the British ; to see how antiaircraft defenses were operating ; to learn what constant air raids and battles could teach; and to see how Britain's land forces were preparing fo r their eventual return to Europe . The Marine Corps Commandant, Major General Thomas Holcomb, made sure that his officers played a strong part in this learning process from th e British.
Holcomb, who had ably commanded a battalion of the 6th Marines in the fighting in France in 1918 , had initially been appointed Commandant by President Roosevelt o n 1 December 1936. After serving wit h distinction through the Europea n outbreak of World War II and th e Corps' initial war-related buildup, h e was reappointed Major General Commandant by the President for a second four-year term on 1 December 1940. The Commandant, besides being a dedicated Marine who championed the Corps during trying times, was also an astute player of the Washington game . A respecte d colleague and friend of the admirals who commanded the Navy, Holcomb was equally at ease and a friend to the politicians who controlled the military budget . He understood the President's determination to see Great Britain survive , as well as his admiration of the British peoples' struggle . Always wel l aware of the value of the public image of the Marine Corps as a force "first to fight;" Holcomb at times yielded to pressures to experimen t with new concepts and authorize new types of organizations which woul d enhance that image . The Marine s whom he sent to Great Britain were imbued with the desire to gai n knowledge and experience tha t would help the Corps get ready for the war they felt sure was coming . In 1941 particularly, the Marine observers, ranging in rank from captains to colonels, visited British ai r stations and air control centers, antiaircraft command complexes and firing battery sites, and all kinds of troop formations . The weapons and equipment being used and the tactic s and techniques being practiced were all of interest . Much of what wa s seen and reported on was of immediate value to the Americans and saw enhanced development in the States . On the air side, briefings on radar developments were invaluable, as wer e demonstrations of ground control intercept practices for night fighters and the use of night fighters themselves .
Anything the British had learned o n air defense control and antiaircraft usage was eagerly absorbed. The Marine air observers would note o n their return that they had dealt wit h numbers of aircraft and concepts of command and control that were not remotely like Marine Corps reality, but all knew that these numbers of aircraft and their control equipmen t were authorized, funded, an d building .
The fascination of the time , although focused on the Battle of Britain's aerial defenses, was not onl y with the air war but also with the "elite" troops, the sea-raiding commandos, as well as the glider an d parachute forces so ably exploited by the Germans in combat and now a prominent part of Britain's army. The role of the commandos, who wer e then Army troops but who eventually would be drawn exclusively from Royal Marines ranks, raised a natura l favorable response in the America n Marines. Most of the observers were enthusiastic about the command o potential, but at least one U .S. Marine senior colonel, Julian C . Smith, who watched commando exercises at Inverary, Scotland, was not overly impressed . Smith, who later commanded the 2d Marine Division at the epic battle for Tarawa, tol d General Holcomb that the commandos "weren't any better than we; that any battalion of Marines could d o the job they do :'
For the moment at least, Smith's view was a minority evaluation, on e not shared, for instance, by commando enthusiast President Roosevelt , and the Marine Corps would see the raising of raider battalions to perform commando-like missions . In similar fashion, and for much th e same reasons, Service enthusiasm for being at the cutting edge and popular acclaim of elite formations, th e Marine Corps raised parachute battalions, glider squadrons, and barrage balloon squadrons, all of which were disbanded eventually in the fac e of the realities of the islanddominated Pacific theater. They might have served their purpose well in Europe or North Africa but th e Marine Corps' destiny was in th e Pacific.
Marines of the pre-Pearl Harbo r Corps, filled with memories of thei r later battles with the Japanese, ar e sometimes prone to forget that Germany was as much their potentia l enemy in 1940-41 as Japan . At th e time, many must have felt as did one artillery lieutenant and later raider officer who took part in fleet exercises of early 1941 that "we all cut ou r teeth on amphibious operations, actually not knowing whether we were going to leave Guantanamo for Europe or the Pacific:' What the Marines at Guantanamo Bay did know was that their Cuban base was bustling with men as mobilize d Reservists and new recruits joined . And as the necessary men came in , the brigade grew in size and abounded with changes of organizations and activations .
The 1st Marine Brigade, at first essentially one infantry regiment, th e 5th Marines, one artillery battalion , the 1st Battalion, 11th Marines, an d supporting troops, had moved to Guantanamo from Quantico in th e late fall of 1940 as its FMF units had outgrown the Virginia base . At "Gitmo, " as it was known to all, the brigade's units became the source of all new organizations . Essentially, existing outfits, from battalion s through platoons, were split in half . To insure a equal distribution of talent as well as numbers, the brigad e commander, Brigadier General Holland M. "Howling Mad" Smith , shrewdly had each unit commande r turn in two equal lists, leaving off th e commanding officer (CO) and his executive officer. As a later combat battalion commander of the 5th recalle d the process, when redesignation took place, "the CO would command on e unit, one former exec would becom e CO of the other . . . . But until th e split was made and the redesignation announced, no CO could kno w which half he would command . In this manner, the 5th Marines gave birth to the 7th Marines and the 1s t Battalion, 11th Marines to the 2 d Battalion . Not too long after, all the units of the 5th, 7th, and 11th Marines and their supporting elements were again split, this time into thre e equal lists, leaving out the thre e senior men . A new regiment, the 1s t Marines with its necessary support, was formed equitably from the 5th and 7th, because the COs of the older units did not know whether they would stay behind (two lists) or tak e over the new outfits.
On 1 February 1941, the 1st Marine Brigade was redesignated the 1st Marine Division while its troops were on board ship heading for th e Puerto Rican island of Culebra fo r maneuvers . At the same time on the west coast, the 2d Brigade, at Sa n Diego, which had grown in a similar fashion from its original infantry regiment, the 6th Marines, was redesignated the 2d Marine Division . Most of its troops, however, were located at a new FMF base, Camp Elliott, in the low, hilly country 1 2 miles northeast of San Diego .
At Marine Corps headquarters, i t was readily apparent that th e planned expansion of the Corps to a n FMF strength of at least two infantry divisions and two supporting aircraft wings would require a vastl y increased supporting establishment . Not least among the new requirements for manpower and equipmen t were those for a new species of units, defense battalions, which were projected to garrison forward bases, including Guantanamo and key American holdings in the Pacific. Also a drawdown on Marin e resources was the need to provide guard detachments for many new naval bases and Navy capital ship s which were being rushed to completion . The surging demand for me n was matched by equal demand fo r training facilities .
What occurred then in late 194 0 and early 1941 was a thorough search by Marines of the east and west coasts of the United States for base sites suitable for training one o r more divisions whose main missio n was amphibious warfare. Extensive combat exercise areas with direct access to the ocean were required . A t the same time, there was a parallel need for suitable airfield locations near the proposed amphibious training sites which would house the planned for but not yet existing squadrons and groups of one or more ai r wings, each with hundreds of fighter, scout-bomber, torpedo-bomber, and utility aircraft . When the first divisions and wings moved out to combat, the new bases were projected to be training bases for reinforcing and replacement organizations .
Camp Elliott and a group o f smaller supporting camps which grew up in its shadow in 1941 wer e barely adequate to house the growing FMF ground establishment on the west coast . The naval air stations in the San Diego area could still handle the limited number of aircraf t available . The same situation was no t true of the three major Marine bases in the east . While Quantico's air station could accommodate the planes of Marine Aircraft Group 1, the main base itself was keyed to suppor t specialist and officer training and was not suitable for extensive FMF operations . Swamp-bound Parris Islan d teemed with recruits and had n o room for the FMF. The newly developed outlying camp at nearby Hilton Head Island was reserved fo r essential defense battalion training . The treaty-restricted area of the nava l base at Guantanamo had no roo m for a reinforced division's 20,00 0 men.
Congress authorized the construction of a vast, new Marine base in coastal North Carolina on 15 February 1941 . It was, in a sense, a remote area that had been picked, certainly not one near any center of population . The Commandant, writing to a fellow general, commented "thos e who want to be near big cities wil l be disappointed because it is certainly out in the sticks," noting however , that it was a great place for maneuvers and amphibious landings . The chosen spot located in the New River area of Onslow County, wa s described by the 1st Division's Worl d War II historian as "111,170 acres o f water, coastal swamp, and plain , J theretofore inhabited largely by san d flies, ticks, chiggers, and snakes ." And he might have added covered by pine forest and scrub growth . One of the Marine veterans of the Nicaragua n jungle campaigns said: "Actually, Nicaragua was a much pleasante r place to live than the New River area at the time . They had mosquitoe s there with snow on the ground." Despite its perceived faults, the di e was cast for New River and construction of a huge tent camp was begu n there in April with a projected readiness date of early summer . The famed brick barracks that were a feature of what would become Cam p Lejeune were on the architect's drawing boards when Marine Barracks , New River, North Carolina, was activated on the 1st of May.
The 1st Division soon became acquainted with the place that one regimental commander noted wa s "the only place between Biloxi, Mississippi, and the New Jersey cape s where you could make a landin g with two divisions abreast ." Coming from Guantanamo, the divisio n spent the summer of 1941 landing across Onslow Beach and moving inland through the swamps and pin e barrens. By that time, Tent Camp o r "Tent City" was ready to receive its new tenants. Strange as it might seem, these 1st Division Marine s reveled in their austere setting amids t the stifling heat. They were already contrasting themselves to those on the west coast, derisively labelled "Hollywood Marines;" because som e units had appeared briefly in movies being shot at the time . There was a feeling, obviously not shared by those in the west, that Parris,Islan d and New River somehow were th e most rugged places to endure, in contrast to those who were close to "civilization ."
The new Marine airfield, whic h was to become an integral part of the North Carolina training complex , was formally established on 18 August 1941 when the administrativ e office for the new "Air Facilities under Development" was established at New Bern, about 40 miles north o f New River. Construction ther e proceeded at the same frenetic pace that marked the development of th e ground training center. In September, the administrators moved to the actual airfield site nearby, Cherr y Point, and on 1 December Marin e Corps Air Station, Cherry Point, wa s activated . Most of the planes on the east coast were still at Quantico, bu t a great start had been made on wha t
Troops of the 1st Marine Division conduct landing exercises from the Intracoasta l Waterway along Onslow Beach at Marine Barracks, New River, North Carolina .
Sketch by Vernon H . Bailey, Navy Art Collection became in short order the center o f a network of training fields which would house enough squadrons and air groups to feed most of the augmentation and replacement demands of four aircraft wings overseas . Th e actual establishment of the initial wing commands took place at Quantico (1st Marine Aircraft Win g [MAW]) on 7 July 1941 and San Diego (2d MAW) on 10 July. Initially, each wing could count on only on e air group as its main strength, Marine Aircraft Group (MAG) 11 in the east and MAG-21 in the west . The vast increase of aircraft and aviatio n personnel that marked the growth o f Marine aviation in World War II wa s in the works . The pilots, aircrewmen , and mechanics were training at Navy air facilities and the planes were coming off assembly lines in steadily increasing numbers . It was August 1942, however, before the impact o f the air buildup would be fully felt at Guadalcanal .
As an all-volunteer force, the Marine Corps was fully deployable during this training and preparedness period . In a sense, the Army was hampered in its readiness by the fac t that its draftees, which soon composed the bulk of its strength, could not be sent outside the U .S. withou t a declaration of war. As a result , when the seizure of the French islan d of Martinique was contemplated i n 1940, the planned assault force wa s the 1st Marine Brigade . When the perceived threat of a garrison in th e Caribbean loyal to Vichy France lessened, other overseas expedition s were also contemplated . In the spring of 1941, the Portuguese Azores became the projected target for an amphibious seizure because it was believed that the Germans might take the strategic islands and thereby seriously threaten the sea lanes of commerce and replenishment for British and Allied bases in the home islands , Africa, and the Mediterranean . Again, Marines were to be in the forefront of the landing force and , again, when the perceived threat lesSpringfield '03 Rifle his rifle was the standard issue to all Marines fro m the early days of the 20th century into the first year of World War II . As a result of intensive marksmanship training, an inseparable bond formed between the individual Marine and this rifle which paid dividends on th e target range and, later, in combat .
The Model 1903 "Springfield" rifle traces its developmen t from the experiences of the U.S. Army in combat agains t the Spanish Army during the Spanish-American War . Th e clip-fed Spanish 7mm Mauser rifle, Model 1893, had a flatter trajectory and a higher sustained rate of fire than th e .30-.40 caliber Krag-Jorgensen rifles used by the U .S . Army. Beginning in 1900, the U.S. Armory in Springfield, Massachusetts, started work on a new service rifle to replace the Krag .
The new rifle, officially adopted on 19 June 1903, was based on the M1898 German Mauser and originally ha d a ramrod bayonet . The rifle was redesigned to accept a knife-type bayonet in 1905 . This change was at least partially due to the concern of President Theodore Roosevel t who commented to the Secretary of War that : "1 must say that I think the ramrod bayonet is about as poor an invention as I ever saw ."
The Model 1903 "Springfield" rifle was first issued to Marines in 1908 and saw its first combat during the Nicaraguan Campaign of 1912 . The obsolescent Krags were almost entirely supplanted by the new '03 Springfields before the Ver a Cruz campaign of 1914 . After service in Mexico, Haiti, an d the Dominican Republic, the '03 Springfield was exclusively used by Marines serving in France with the American Expeditionary Force during World War I . Following the war, an improved version was used by Marines in Chin a and in the jungles of the Caribbean Islands and Centra l America .
The accuracy of the '03 Springfield was without peer , and the Marine Corps based its developing marksmanshi p program on this rifle . The Marine Corps designed an improved set of front and rear sights and soon led the othe r services in prowess with the rifle . Indeed, by the outbrea k of World War II, the Marine Corps had formed a cul t around the rifle .-Kenneth L . Smith-Christmas sened, the operation was called off . A new unit, the 1st Marine Brigade 99-year leases to bases at British AtThe buildup of forces for the (Provisional), was activated . When lantic possessions. These bases were potential Azores campaign did have the ships began to load massive all naval and naval bases require d a profound effect on the Marine amounts of supplies, including Marine guards . As a result, a senio r Corps, however, despite its cancella-winter protective gear and clothing, Marine colonel, Omar T . Pfeiffer, tion . The core regimental combat the favorite rumor of the Marines, was made a member and recorder o f team of the 2d Division, the 6th Ma-that they were headed to a warm and a board of naval officers, the Greensrines and its supporting units, judged sunny clime, was effectively lade Board, that surveyed the Britthe most ready for active employ-scotched . The convoy left Charleston ish locations in the late summer o f ment, loaded out from San Diego in soon after and on 7 July 1941 made 1940 to recommend appropriat e May 1941 to sail through the Pana-landfall at Iceland . For nine months American base strength and facilities . ma Canal and augment the Marine thereafter, one of the precious few Flown first to Bermuda, the boar d troops on the east coast . Enroute, the trained Marine infantry regiments members moved on by air to ArgenAzores objective disappeared and was in garrison in Iceland, and the tia, Newfoundland, and Nassau i n another took its place, Iceland . The 2d Division was short a vital element the Bahamas, and from there touched strategic island in the middle of the of its strength . The sudden and un-down at Guantanamo where they North Atlantic had been occupied by expected deployment of the 6th Ma-boarded the cruiser St. Louis for the British troops to forestall a similar rines to the Atlantic was to have a rest of their journey . Sailing to KingGerman move . The British wanted considerable effect on the employ-ston, Jamaica ; Port-of-Spain , their Iceland occupation troops back ment of Marine ground forces in the Trinidad ; and Georgetown, Britis h in the United Kingdom and asked for days after Pearl Harbor.
Guyana, the board then checked th e Americans to take their place .
The drawdown on Marine islands of Tobago, St . Lucia, and AnWhen President Roosevelt made strength represented by the departure tigua . At each of these places, it was the decision to comply with the Brit-of 5,000 men to Iceland was but a determined that a Marine guar d ish request, seeing the move as vital part of the drain of manpower that detachment was needed an d to protecting sea traffic from German came about as a result of the fact that 50-to-100-man companies were actiraiders, the 6th Marines was at sea Marines could be sent anywhere at vated for that purpose in Januar y and, all unwitting, became the choice any time . In his zeal to support the 1941 so that the Marines could guar d for the first American troops to British in ways short of war, and to the facilities as they were built . It wa s deploy . When the regiment's troop enhance American hemispheric not bad duty for the men involved , ships reached Charleston, South defenses, the President in mid-1940 but their deployment meant a battalCarolina, after the Panama passage, had authorized a swap of 50 overage ion less of Marines for the FMF . Despite the possible and actual overseas deployments of Marines i n the Atlantic Theater throughou t 1941, the weight of Marine commitment was in the Pacific. And there was no question of the potential enemy there. It was Japan .
Pacific Theate r
Throughout 1941, the U .S. and Japan sparred on the diplomati c front, with the thrust of American effort aimed at halting Japanese advances on the Asian mainland . In March, the government of Premier Prince Konoye in Japan sent a new representative to Washington, Ambassador Kichisaburo Nomura , whose task was to negotiate a settlement of differences between the tw o nations . He was confronted with a statement of the basic American bargaining position that was wholly incompatible with the surgin g nationalism of the Japanes e militarists who were emboldened by their successes in China . The U.S. wanted Japan to agree to respect the territorial integrity and sovereignt y of all nations ; to support the principle of noninterference in the interna l affairs of other countries ; to agree to a policy of equal access to all countries, including commercial access ; and to accept the status quo in th e Pacific.
The chance of Japan accepting any of these stipulations vanished with the German invasion of Russia i n June . Freed from the threat of th e Russians, the Japanese moved swiftly to occupy southern Indochina an d reinforced their armed forces by calling up all reservists and increasing conscriptions . In the face of this new proof of Japanese intent, President Roosevelt froze all Japanese assets in the United States, effectively severing commercial relations between the two countries .
In October, a new militaristic government headed by Genera l Hideki Tojo seized power in Tokyo, and a new special ambassador, Saburo Kurusu, was sent to Washington, ostensibly to revitalize negotiations for a peaceful settlement o f differences . Short of a miracle, however, the Japanese Army an d Navy leaders did not consider peac e a likely outcome of the talks with th e Americans . They were, in fact , preparing to go to war.
If war came, U.S. Marines would be among the first to experience it s violence . In China, Marines had a garrison role in foreign concession s at Shanghai, Peiping, and Tientsin, and in the Philippines, they had sizeable guard units at the naval base s at Cavite and Olongapo on Luzon Island . They provided as well ships ' detachments for the woefully few cruisers of the Asiatic Fleet headquartered at Manila . In the Western Pacific's Mariana Islands, there wa s a small naval station on the Navygoverned island of Guam, a certain Japanese wartime target .
American Samoa in the southeas t Pacific, whose islands were also a Navy responsibility, was strategically vital as guardian of the sea routes to New Zealand and Australia from the States . At Pago Pago on Tutuila, American Samoa's largest island, there was a deep harbor and a lightly manned naval base . Recognizing its isolation and vulnerability t o Japanese attack, the Navy began deploying Marines to augment it s meager garrison late in 1940. The advance party of Marines who arrived at Pago Pago on 21 December wer e members of the 7th Defense Battalion, which had been formally activated at San Diego on the 16th .
Initially a small composite outfi t of 400 men, the 7th had a headquarters battery, an infantry company, and an artillery battery as well as a detail whose task it was to raise and train a battalion of Samoan natives as Marine infantrymen . The Sa- moans, who were American nationals, would help the 7th defend Tutuila's 52 square miles of mountainous and jungled terrain . The defense battalion's main bod y reached Pago Pago in March 1942 and the 1st Samoan Battalion, Marine Corps Reserve, came into bein g in August . The Marines in Samoa , thinly manning naval coast defense and antiaircraft guns at Pago Pago and patrolling Tutuila's many isolated beaches were acutely aware tha t their relative weakness invite d Japanese attack . They shared thi s heightened sense of danger with the Marines in the western Pacific, i n China, on Luzon, and at Guam, a s well as other defense battalion Marines who were gradually manning the island outposts guarding Hawaii . These few thousand men all knew that they stood a good chance of proving one again the time-honored Marine Corps recruiting slogan "First to Fight;" if war came .
In 1938, the Navy's Hepburn Board had determined that four small American atolls to the south and west of Pearl Harbor should be developed as American naval air bases and defended by naval aircraft and Marine garrisons . The two largest atolls of the four were Wake , 2,000 miles west of Hawaii in the central Pacific near the Japanese Marshall Islands group, and Midway, 1,150 miles from Oahu, and not fa r from the international date line . Both islands were way stations for Pa n American clipper service to the Orient . Midway also served as a relay station for the trans-Pacific cable . Eight hundred miles southwest of Pearl Harbor lay Johnston Atoll , whose main island could accommodate an airfield and a small garrison . Palmyra, 1,100 miles south o f Hawaii, had barely enough room fo r an airstrip and a bob-tailed defense force . The islands at Wake and Midway each had room enough to accommodate a battalion of defending Marines as well as airfields to hol d several squadrons of patrol and fighter aircraft .
The Navy's 14th Naval District , which encompassed the Hawaiian Islands and the outpost atolls, as wel l as Samoa, was responsible for building defenses and providing garrisons , both ground and air. The Marin e contingents were the responsibility o f Colonel Harry K . Pickett, Marin e Officer of the 14th District and Commanding Officer, Marine Barracks, Pearl Harbor Navy Yard . Preliminary surveys of the atolls and Samo a were conducted by members of Pickett's staff in 1940 and early 1941 . Civilian contractors were selected to build the airfields and their supporting installations, but most of th e work on the coast defense and antiaircraft gun positions, the bunker s and beach defenses, fell to the lot of the Marines who were to man them . Midway was slated to have a ful l defense battalion as its garrison , Wake drew about half a battalion at first, and Johnston and Palmyra were allotted reinforced batteries .
By late 1941, the standard table o f organization of a defense battalion had evolved to include a unit of about 900 men, composed of thre e 5-inch coast defense gun batteries, three 3-inch antiaircraft gun batteries, a sound locator and searchligh t battery, a battery of .50-caliber antiaircraft machine guns, and a battery of .30-caliber machine guns for beach defenses . That was the standard; the actuality varied with the location . The characteristic all defense battalion garrisons had in commo n was lots of guns and gun crews . What they were all short of was infantrymen . If an enemy landing force reached the island beaches, the gu n crews and other specialists could expect, and would be expected, to prove once again that every Marin e was a rifleman before all else.
The 1st and 3d Defense Battalions were the first Marines to reach the island outposts . Advance elements o f the 3d Battalion landed at Midwa y in May 1940 to conduct reconnaissance and undertake preliminar y construction . The rest of the battalion remained at Pearl Harbor providing reinforcing and relief parties unti l January 1941 when the whole battalion was ordered forward . In February, while the men of the 3d were unloading their heavy equipment a t Midway, the advance party of the 1s t Battalion left San Diego on board the carrier Enterprise, transferring a t Pearl to a small cargo ship, and moving on to Johnston, where two 5-inch guns and an eight-man caretaker detail landed, while the rest of th e party, three officers and 45 enlisted men, proceeded to Palmyra . After the rest of the 1st Defense Battalio n shipped out to Pearl Harbor, smal l reinforcing detachments moved forward to the outpost islands to join i n the pick and shovel work of emplacing guns and digging in comman d posts, magazines, and fire direction centers . It was August 1941 before the first elements of the 1st Battalion reached Wake where a contractor's work force was already building an airfield .
On all the outpost islands where Marines were stationed, the work was constant and boring . The arrival of a plane or ship was an event to celebrate. There was no liberty. If there had been, there was no place to go and nothing to see but the Pacific in all directions . The 14th District established a rotation policy (back to Pearl) for the outpost Marines, but this reward was countered by a pervading urgency to get on with the job at hand, protecting th e approaches to Hawaii . The 6th Defense Battalion, which arrived at Pearl Harbor in January 1941 as a replacement and reserve unit, moved forward to Midway in September to replace the 3d Battalion as the defending ground garrison . The 3d moved back to Oahu for a well earned rest from constructio n work . On 1 December, the 4t h Defense Battalion, fresh from dut y at Guantanamo Bay, arrived at Pearl . It was scheduled to replace the half battalion of the 1st on Wake, but its arrival and strengthened force wa s too late to effect relief . Wake did receive a substantial and welcome reinforcement on 4 December, however, when 12 F4F-3 Grumman Wildcats of Marine Fighting Squa-
Grumman F4F Wildca t
he Grumman Wildcat served as the primary fighte r of the United States Marine Corps at the outbrea k of the Pacific War. By December 1941, Grumma n Wildcats were being flown by three of four Marine fighte r squadrons then in existence.
Designed in 1936 as Grumman's first monoplane fighter aircraft, the Wildcat had retractable handcranked landing gear, vacuum-powered flaps, and a simple electrical system . Although it lost a design contest to its main competitor, the Brewster F2A Buffalo, in 1938, the Navy nonetheless continued to encourage Grumman in the aircraft's development . Wildcats were delivered to the Marine Corps in 1941, replacing the obsolescent Grumman F3F-2 fabri c and metal biplanes which had been in service since 1937 . The all-metal F4F- Despite the fact that the Wildcat's performance was inferior to its primary adversary, the Japanese Zero, it s staunch ruggedness and greatly superior firepower in the hands of skilled and determined pilots would enable it to compile a distinguished record during the war. There were 34 recorded Marine Corps Wildcat aces.
-Kenneth L. Smith-Christmas mooring mast field in the 1920s . Those planes of MAG-21 not at th e airfield were deployed on board carriers for transportation to reinforc e Wake and Midway. VMF-221 with 14 F2A-3 Brewster Buffalo fighter s boarded the Saratoga at North Island, San Diego on 7 and 8 December . The Lexington got 18 SB2U-3 Chance-Vought Vindicators of Marine Scout-Bombing Squadron 231 . With the fall of Wake, both squadrons were used to reinforce Midway . At Ewa, there were 48 fighters, scoutbombers, and utility aircraft, mos t scheduled for forward deployment . Aviation units were not the only elements of the FMF to move forward into the Pacific by December 1941 . A sizeable portion of the 2d Marin e Division's 2d Engineer Battalion wa s also deployed to Oahu in the fall i n order to build a camp capable of accommodating 5,000 Marines . The location of the new facility, Cam p Catlin, was in the canefields east of Honolulu along the island's main highway. Its site selected by a boar d of Marine colonels, Catlin eventually would see tens of thousands o f Marines pass through its gates into the farther reaches of the Pacific as it became the principal replacemen t and redistribution center for the FMF. In December it was half completed, and its Marine engineer constructors were destined to be the first members of the 2d Division to see combat in World War II.
Back in California, the 2d Marin e Division was rounding into shape, engaged as was the 1st Division i n constant training and maneuvers. Neither unit had reached its ful l strength yet as constant demands fo r Marines for base, fleet, and barrack s duty drained the available manpower pool as fast as it filled . San Diego's recruit depot was crowded with men striving to become Marines, but it no longer had to call on the 2d Divisio n for extra drill instructors as it ha d often in 1940 after the President declared a National Emergency and the recruiting stations were flooded with applicants. The recruit training cycle, down to as few as 24 days o n both coasts in 1940, was fairly sta - The spread of defense battalio n Marines at the beginning of December found 422 officers and men of th e 1st Battalion at Wake, 162 at Johnston, 158 at Palmyra, and 261 a t Pearl Harbor. Midway's 6th Battalion garrison had 33 officers and 81 0 enlisted men . The 3d Battalion was 863 strong at Pearl and the newly arrived 4th mustered 818 . Both of the larger atolls had six 5-inch coast defense guns and twelve 3-inch antiaircraft guns; Johnston had tw o 5-inch guns and four 3-inch guns ; Palmyra had four of each . Machin e guns for defense matched the garrisons' size ; Midway had 3 0 .50-calibers and 30 .30-calibers; Wake had 18 and 30; Johnston and Palmyra each had eight apiece .
Although VMF 211's Wildcats o n Wake were the only Marine aircraf t yet to reach the outpost defenses , most of the squadrons parent Marine Aircraft Group 21 had moved fro m California to Hawaii by December. MAG-21 was the 2d Wing's only tactical air group. Part of the group's ground echelon moved west to Midway in November to await aircraf t due to arrive shortly. Meanwhile, al l Marine aircraft in Hawaii were concentrated at the Marine Corps Ai r Station, Ewa, 10 miles west of Pearl Harbor, the site of a Navy dirigible ble at seven weeks, with three on the rifle range .
The Fleet Marine Force units in the west, like those in the east, were itching for action, although the Commandant noted at the time tha t Marines still needed "to train (further) for combat;' a quite different situation. Most of the planes and crewmen of the 2d Wing were already at least as far west as Hawaii . The 2d Division was poised to joi n them .
Still in the future, the near future, were the great air and amphibiou s training centers at El Toro and Camp Pendleton. Pendleton, in particular, was to be part of the experiences o f most Marines who served in the Pacific either going or coming . In December 1941, the area, as one private on its original survey team remembered, was "pretty barren country" fit only for cattle . His observation wa s not an uncommon sentiment of late r Marines, who followed him into th e seemingly endless brown hills and valleys .
The Stage is Se t
On 22 November 1941, Genera l Holcomb spoke to the American public on NBC radio as part of a Navy public relations program . In his brief remarks, he summed up th e Corps' situation in the context of th e country's readiness . He noted that there were 61,000 Marines in unifor m and that :
Beyond the continental limits of the United States, Marines do duty as the frontiersmen of the nation's huge new defense network . The existing stations from the Philippines to the Virgin Islands have had their garrisons increased . The Navy's new bases-Iceland, Newfoundland, Bermuda, Santa Lucia, Antigua, Trinidad , Jamaica, British Guiana, Dutch Harbor, Samoa, Kodiak, the Hawaiian Island group, and other outlyin g stations-all are garrisoned and guarded, at least partially, by United State s Marines .
commanding the 1st Provisional Brigade in Iceland, telling him tha t it was "important to get the Brigad e home" and promising "you can b e sure that we will leave no stone unturned to accomplish it :' Its men were wanted back in the 2d Marine Division and the arrival of U .S. Army reinforcements in strength in Icelan d gave the Marine Corps strong argument for the recovery of its forces . The fact that the Marines had come under Army command did nothin g to lessen the urgency of the situation .
In his radio report, the Commandant did not mention the Marines stationed in China, perhaps becaus e the decision had been made to withdraw them . In September, the American Consul-General at Shanghai, the Navy commander of the Yangtze River Patrol, and the Commanding Officer, 4th Marines had jointl y recommended that all U .S. nava l forces in China be pulled out o f Japanese-controlled territory, a recommendation heartily endorse d by the Commander, Asiatic Fleet . The authorization for the evacuation was delayed by State and Nav y Department negotiations until 1 0 November and it was the 27th before the first of two chartered passenger liners, the President Madison, loaded half the 4th Marines and its equipment and departed Shanghai . Th e next day, the rest of the regimen t boarded the President Harrison and sailed. At the outbreak of World War II, Marines were wearin g a modernized version of the helmet first introduced to Marines serving in France during World War I . The America n M1917 helmet was nearly identical to the British "Brodi e Pattern" helmet . In 1939, this helmet was superceded in the Marine Corps by the improved M1917A1 helmet (a s shown below, worn by men of the 6th Marines in Iceland) . The padded leather liner and two-piece canvas chinstrap of this updated version of the "tin hat," as it was then called , made it far more comfortable and sturdier than it s predecessor . The steel helmet shell remained the same . I n the Marine Corps, the helmet was worn both with an d without insignia and, while most Marines wore the helmet in the rough olive drab paint, some units, most notably those in China, burnished, waxed, and polished theirs .
Less than two years after the Marine Corps ' adoptio n of the M1917A1, a U .S . Army research team at Fort Benning under of Major Harold G . Sydenham, began working on a new design for a two-piece helmet which offere d far more protection for the wearer . Adopted by the government as the Ml helmet on 9 June 1941, the Hadfield manganese steel helmet was first made by the McCord Radiato r Company of Detroit, Michigan, while the fiber liner wa s manufactured by the Hawley Products Company . At th e suggestion of General George S . Patton, the liner's suspension system was patterned after a design by John T . Riddell that was used in contempory football helmets . The ne w helmet was issued to the Marine Corps in the spring an d early summer of 1942 and, by the time of the Guadalcana l campaign later that summer, had all but supplanted the old "dishpan " helmet . The destination of both liners was the naval base at Olangapo in th e Philippines where the 4th was to join the naval forces defending the islands, in particular the 1st Separate Battalion at Cavite. The ships arrived on 30 November and 1 December. The President Harrison, as planned , was unloaded quickly in order t o return to China and pick up the Marines stationed at Peiping and Tientsin, but it was too late . The Japanese Pearl Harbor attack force was already well on its way to its target .
The embassy guard detachment s in China were assembling their gear to ship out through the all-weather port of Chinwangtao . The small Marine camp there was named Camp Holcomb, a fact that annoyed th e Commandant somewhat as he believed no Marine facilities should b e named after living persons . He pointed out in his 22 November letter t o General Marston that the camp stil l bore his name 'but it will be a thin g of the past in a few days :' The Commandant was obviously referring t o the impending evacuation of the embassy Marines, but in fact these men , trapped in a hopeless situation, les s than 200 in number, were capture d on the first day of the war .
In a general sense, the Marin e Corps was ready to fight on 7 December 1941, as it has always been regardless of its size . Nearly a third of the Corps' strength was already overseas deployed to stations an d outposts, where it shared, often wit h Navy and Army forces, the challeng e of being in the forefront of battle if war came . The few thousand Marines who could realistically picture themselves at risk of immediate attack embodied the spirit of thousands more who knew their tur n would come.
In the immediate future, once wa r began, the Corps would grow to unheralded numbers, far beyond wha t any prewar Marine had imagined . The nucleus of Marines that would give strength to this vast assemblage , almost half a million men and women by 1944, was already in place in 
Cargo Net Landing
One of the things that have been said about the Marines is that the y are "first ashore and at the scene of action" This means that the me n who join Uncle Sam's Marine Corps must be well trained in the duty of getting ashore quickly. One of their drills that teaches them to make a rapid landing from their transport employs a cargo net slun g over the ship's side. With their rifles dangling from their shoulders th e " Leathernecks" line up on the deck of the ship . Then at a given signa l they climb over the side, using the cargo net as a rather unsteady ladder. The first men down grab opposite sides of the net to help stead y it for those who follow. For training purposes the men land on a stationary platform or pier over which the cargo net is hung (se e picture) .
.
Uncle Sam-Marine
Marine Sky Troops
Not to be outdone by their Soldier cousins, the "Soldiers of the Se anthe United States Marines-have also been experimenting wit h Parachute Troops . This new idea of landing troops from the sk y promises to be a valuable addition to Marine training, fitting nicely into their landing party duty. Similar to the training of Army Sky Troops, the Marines who volunteer for this service practice jumping from various heights to become skillful in making a sudden landin g from the sky. They attempt to drop from lower and lower heights t o cut down the time it takes to reach the earth and thus to lessen th e danger of discovery by the enemy. The 'chute opens automatically . There is also an emergency 'chute which can be opened by the jumps r if necessary. The picture shows a detachment of jumpers being dropped from a slow-moving Navy blimp during an initial stage o f training.
. Uncle Sam-Marine Field Radio
The problem of field detachments of troops keeping in touch wit h headquarters and bases of supplies is today largely solved by radio . At the Marine Radio Operators School, selected marines have a n opportunity to study elementary radio theory, elementary electricity, radio sending and receiving, typing, Naval radio procedure an d field radio sets . It qualifies them for positions of greater trust an d responsibility while in Service for Uncle Sam and fits them for goodpaying positions on the outside when their period of enlistment i s ended. In the picture two marines are operating a portable radi o sending and receiving set in the field. In this case they are keeping in touch with headquarters aboard a transport anchored in the harbor a good many miles away.
. Uncle Sam-Marine
Shore Duty
On shore marines live in large barracks or Service buildings wher e they can be quickly mobilized for emergencies . When stationed o n shore at the Navy Yards and at Naval Stations their duties are to protect government property from theft, injury, or fire, and to preven t disorders of any kind. They also perform duties as infantrymen, artillerymen, machine gunners, signal men, motor transport, and occasionally as mounted infantry. The picture shows marines on Guard Duty in a Navy Yard during a war emergency. At these times th e regulations are tightened and the marines have to be on the aler t to prevent suspicious-looking individuals from gaining any information that would be harmful to Uncle Sam's interest . The pilots of all ranks, although as yet only a few hundred in number, were skilled and capable, men wh o could look forward to leading thousands of men who were in the training pipeline . Dominating the whole scene o f Corps mobilization and increases i n strength was a solid core of noncommissioned officers who had share d the veteran officers' experiences an d who were, in the words of man y qualified to comment, truly "the backbone of the Corps ." In a real way, these sergeants and corporals of whatever stripe were the ones who tions of leadership and loyalty to fellow Marines . They imbued in th e men with whom they served a feeling of what it means to be a Marine , of what if takes to be a Marine .
In the war that was to come, on the eve of the Pearl Harbor attack , these Marines of all ranks had a strong identity with the past . They were the inventors, in General Holcomb's words in his 1941 Marine Corps Birthday message, of ".this high name of distinction and soldierly repute" won for all by "those who have preceded us in the Corps ." The prewar Marines, both boot and veteran, were to add immeasurably to the Corps' laurels and traditions in th e first year of fighting at Wake, Guam , Bataan, Corregidor, Midway, Makin, and Guadalcanal . Throughout th e course of World War II, they were th e men of "The Old Corps" whose accomplishments set the standard for all Marines . 
